ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a new chaos-based encryption scheme for medical images. It is based on a combination of chaos and DNA computing under the scenario of two encryption rounds, preceded by a key generation layer, and follows the permutation-substitution-diffusion structure. The SHA-256 hash function alongside the initial secret keys is employed to produce the secret keys of the chaotic systems. Each round of the proposed algorithm involves six steps, i.e., block-based permutation, pixel-based substitution, DNA encoding, bit-level substitution (i.e., DNA complementing), DNA decoding, and bit-level diffusion. A thorough search of the relevant literature yielded only this time the pixel-based substitution and the bit-level substitution are used in cascade for image encryption. The key-streams in the bit-level substitution are based on the logistic-Chebyshev map, while the sine-Chebyshev map allows producing the key-streams in the bit-level diffusion. The final encrypted image is obtained by repeating once the previous steps using new secret keys. Security analyses and computer simulations both confirm that the proposed scheme is robust enough against all kinds of attacks. Its low complexity indicates its high potential for real-time and secure image applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid progress in communications networks has led to ever increasing amounts traffic of multimedia data (i.e., images, audio, and video) over unsecured communications channels. Generally, user data contain both confidential and private information, so their security has become indispensable for protecting users from a variety of malicious attacks, avoiding loss of information, and guaranteeing integrity. As of now, many technologies are applicable for ensuring a high level of security of medical images, such as steganography [1] , [2] , watermarking [3] , [4] , and encryption [5] - [8] . In fact, to transform an original image into an unrecognizable one, encryption techniques can be employed. Encryption of medical images (e.g., mammograms, MRI, Chest X-rays, CT scans, etc.) is one of the most convenient
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Muhammad Imran Tariq. strategies to protect the security of patients' personal information over public networks against malicious attacks. Since medical images are the private data of patients, ensuring their secure storage and transmission has become an important issue for medical applications in real-world problems [5] - [7] , [9] , [10] . In the last decades, chaotic cryptosystems have been much studied on account of their random behavior, ergodicity, and sensitivity to secret keys, a result of the initial conditions and control parameters [11] , [12] . Therefore, chaotic systems fulfill the classic Shannon requirements regarding confusion and diffusion [13] , and are well suited for cryptography problems, such as image encryption. In addition, the structure of a chaos-based encryption scheme has a low level of complexity, while ensuring a high level of security. Therefore, many chaotic image encryption schemes have been proposed [9] , [14] - [20] .
In [15] , Zhou et al. proposed a simple and effective chaosbased encryption scheme using a combination of logistic and tent maps, namely the Logistic-Tent System (LTS). Firstly, a random pixel is inserted in the beginning of each row in the original image under consideration. So, each row is divided into a 1D matrix, and a substitution process, based on the LTS system, is applied to each row. Thereafter, all 1D matrices are combined into a 2D matrix according to their row positions in the original image. Then, the obtained 2D matrix is rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise. The encrypted image is finally obtained by repeating these operations four times.
A new image encryption scheme termed the Tent-Logistic map-based data encryption algorithm (TL-DEA) is proposed in [16] . The scheme achieves two rounds of an SP-network on each pixel. An original image is divided into data blocks of a fixed length. Then, substitution and permutation processes are performed on each block, using the Tent-Logistic map. All encrypted blocks are combined to obtain the encrypted image.
In [18] , a new chaos-based encryption scheme is proposed. It is composed of two layers, i.e., a diffusion layer followed by a bit-permutation layer. The diffusion process, repeated r d times, is based on a binary matrix of size 32 × 32. The permutation is done using a new modified 2-D cat map, running at the data bit level, and it retrieves its dynamic key (i.e., initial condition and control parameter) from a chaotic generator. This is iterated r p times. The entire process is repeated r times until it reaches the required security level.
Recently, a new medical image encryption scheme based on the edge maps of a source image is designed in [9] . It is dubbed EMMIE and consists of three phases, namely bit-plane decomposition, generation of a random sequence, and permutation. A reversible decomposition method is first applied to the input medical image in order to produce some bit-planes. Then, the edge maps (i.e., binary matrices with the same size as the original bit-planes) obtained from the source image are XORed with the original bit-planes. Finally, the bit positions of all the obtained bit-planes are shuffled and then collected together with a pixel diffusion operation, which generates the encrypted image.
Wu et al. [19] combine the chaotic tent maps (CTM) with the rectangular transform (RT) for an image encryption scheme design. The scheme is composed of t pixelpermutation rounds, followed by a pixel-diffusion layer. The pixel permutations are performed using the enhanced two-dimensional rectangular transform, while the pixeldiffusion layer is controlled by chaotic tent maps.
Furthermore, DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) computing technology has recently been improved and used in several fields, especially in cryptography. Thanks to its good features, such as massive parallelism, huge storage, and ultralow power consumption [21] , [22] , it is suitable in the context of cryptography applications. Therefore, a variety of encryption schemes merging chaos systems with DNA encoding have been proposed in recent years [23] - [30] . For example, Wang et al. proposed a new image encryption scheme based on DNA sequence operations and chaotic systems [27] . The scheme follows the diffusion-permutation architecture.
The diffusion works on the pixels, and is controlled by pseudorandom sequences derived from a spatiotemporal chaos system, namely, the CML (coupled map lattice). After being DNA encoded, the confused image is employed to update the initial conditions of the CML, making the cryptosystem robust against known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks. By using the new initial conditions, DNA-level permutation operating both on the rows and columns is performed. The permuted DNA matrix is then confused once again and DNA decoded to obtain the encrypted image.
In addition, a secure and efficient image encryption scheme based on self-adaptive permutation-diffusion and DNA random encoding is proposed in [23] . This scheme is composed of n rounds, each of them consisting of four phases, namely DNA random encoding, self-adaptive permutation, self-adaptive diffusion, and DNA random decoding. The permutation and diffusion procedures both work on the pixels, governed by the hyper-chaotic Lorenz system, and supported by a quantization process. The cryptosystem has good immunity against plaintext attacks, as the quantization processes are disturbed by the intrinsic features of the original image.
Unlike standard images, medical images have a distinctive feature, i.e., they contain more than 70% of 0's bits [31] . Therefore, in the original image, the higher bitplanes are quite similar to the lower ones, which makes vulnerable the image cryptosystems with high concentration to higher bit-planes as the lower bit-planes contain significant information [32] . From the basis, the pixel modification in [33] and [34] becomes low efficiency in the encryption process. Broadly, the high ratio of 0's bits, downgrades the encryption impact of the permutation and substitution operations. Accordingly, there is an urgency of an appropriate and efficient image cryptosystem to accommodate the challenge of 0's bits in medical images. Besides, it should respond to the low complexity and high efficiency required by telemedicine applications.
In this context, a new medical image cryptosystem is proposed through this paper. The main architecture of this cipher consists of block-based permutation, pixel-based substitution, DNA encoding, bit-level substitution (i.e., DNA complementing), DNA decoding, and bit-level diffusion. It is clear that the proposed architecture fulfills the requirements of a strong cipher; confusion and diffusion. The major contributions of this paper are four-fold as summarized below. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the pixel-based substitution and the bit-level substitution are used in cascade for image ciphering. Secondly, the secret keys of the proposed cipher are generated by the 256-bit long hash value that depends on the original image; such dependency spreads minor changes applied in the original image or the initial keys to the entire encrypted image and then ensured a high resistance against known/chosen plaintext attacks. Thirdly, the major part of the cipher consists of permutation and substitution process, which are of low complexity time. Fourthly, instead of higher-dimensional chaotic systems, the keystreams are generated by two enhanced 1-D chaotic maps [35] , where excellent chaotic performances are obtained, and the famed constraints of 1D chaotic systems are surpassed. Hence, the time complexity is further reduced.
The proposed algorithm consists of two rounds, preceded by a key generation layer, and follows the permutationsubstitution-diffusion structure. In the first round, the considered secret keys (i.e., initial conditions and control parameters) of the chaotic systems are generated and controlled by initial secret keys and the 256-bit long hash value of the original image. The SHA-256 hash value of the pixels' sum of the original image alongside the new secret keys are employed to produce the secret keys of the second round. Therefore, the resultant key-streams are correlated with both the initial secret keys and the input image, which are highly sensitive to the flip a single bit in either the input image or in the secret keys. The steps of the proposed algorithm are given as follows. A block-based permutation procedure is first applied. Thereafter, the permuted blocks are combined, decomposed into four parts, and replaced by S-boxes, as in [36] . Then, these blocks are combined, converted into binary form, DNA encoded, and complemented by a binary matrix produced using the logistic-Chebyshev map. Subsequently, the complemented matrix is DNA decoded and then encrypted by a bit-level diffusion layer. The diffusion layer operates using a chaotic matrix derived from the sineChebyshev map. By means of second round's secret keys, the aforementioned operations are performed to obtain the final encrypted image. The proposed scheme is shown to be sufficiently fast, while maintaining a high level of security. Simulation results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed encryption scheme compared to some existing schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The preliminaries, including DNA encoding and chaotic systems, are presented in Section II. Section III describes the proposed scheme in detail, followed by an analysis of the proposed scheme in Section IV. Finally, concluding remarks are drawn in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. DNA ENCODING
DNA is a molecule that contains the genetic information used in the growth, development, functioning, and reproduction of any living organism and diverse viruses. A DNA sequence comprises four nucleic acid bases, i.e., A (Adenine), G (Guanine), C (Cytosine), and T (Thymine). These DNA bases follow the Watson-Crick [37] principle. That is, A and T are complementary, and C and G are complementary. Usually, the four DNA bases A, C, G, and T are encoded by two bits, i.e., 00, 01, 10, and 11. In binary encoding, 0 and 1 are complementary, so 00 and 11 are complementary, as are 01 and 10. By using four bases A, C, G and T to encode 00, 01, 10 and 11, there are 24 encoding rules, out of which there are only eight rules (see Table 1 ) satisfying the complementary relations among the bases. DNA decoding rules are the reverse of its encoding counterparts. For example, if the grayscale value of a pixel is 100, its corresponding binary value is ''10011101'', which can be encoded as the DNA sequence ''GCAC'' using DNA encoding Rule 7.
B. LOGISTIC-CHEBYSHEV MAP
The logistic-Chebyshev map (denoted by LCv) is an enhanced one-dimensional (1D) chaotic system that combines two well-known seed maps, namely the logistic map and the Chebyshev map [35] . It is defined as follows
where x n ∈ (0, 1) is the initial value and α ∈ (0, 4] is a control parameter. The degree of the Chebyshev map is b ∈ N.
C. SINE-CHEBYSHEV MAP
The sine-Chebyshev map (denoted by SCv) is an improved one-dimensional (1D) chaotic system that combines two well-known seed maps, namely the sine map and the Chebyshev map [35] . It is defined as follows
where x n ∈ (0, 1) is the initial value, α ∈ (0, 4] is a control parameter, and b ∈ N is the degree of the Chebyshev map.
III. PROPOSED MEDICAL IMAGE ENCRYPTION APPROACH A. PERMUTATION FUNCTION AND ITS INVERSE
In modular arithmetic, when p is a prime number then it is divisible by any non-zero number. Thus, for each x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} there is one and only one number y ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} such that
The result given by (3) is derived from the Fermat's little theorem. It follows from (3) that we define the following a permutation function
where a = {1, . . . , l}, l is an integer and p is a prime number considered to be the key of (4). This function allows the generation of a random sequence b 1×l from {1, . . . , l}. The sequence a can be recovered as a = (p × b) mod l. VOLUME 7, 2019 Let p be a prime number and P be an M ×N image partitioned into l blocks of size m × n, D m×n . The block with index i is denoted by D m×n i
, where i = 1, 2, . . . , l. Now, we use (4) to calculate the new indices b of these blocks. Therefore, the permuted blocks F m×n are obtained as follows
By merging F m×n into an M × N matrix, we obtain the permuted image C. Fig. 1 shows the original image of XA Coronary and its permuted versions generated by applying (4) and (5) with different block sizes. 
B. GENERATION OF THE INITIAL VALUES AND THE CONTROL PARAMETERS OF THE CHAOTIC MAPS
SHA-256 is a commonly used cryptographic hash function with 256-bit hash value [38] . For two images with only onebit difference, to produce entirely different secret keys of the chaotic systems (1) and (2), the SHA-256 hash values of the original image κ 1 and that of its sum of pixels κ 2 are employed. In the proposed algorithm, the secret keys (i.e., initial conditions and control parameters) (x 0 , α 0 ) and (x 1 , α 1 ) of (1) and (2), respectively, are updated by means of the SHA-256 hash function. We first compute the SHA-256 hash value κ 1 and then divide it into 8-bit blocks as follows
The secret keys are updated as follows
where ⊕ denotes the bit-XOR operation, and bin2dec() is a function that converts a binary string to the corresponding decimal number. Secondly, using the updated parameters alongside the SHA-256 hash value κ 2 , we calculate the new parameters x 0 , α 0 , x 1 , and α 1 using (6)- (10). 
C. ENCRYPTION PROCESS
The detailed steps of the proposed medical encryption approach, illustrated in Fig. 2 , are given below.
• Step 1: Input 8-bit gray image P M ×N , where M × N are the dimensions of the rows and columns of the image. Also, let (x 0 , α 0 ) and (x 1 , α 1 ) be the secret keys (i.e., initial conditions and control parameters) of (1) and (2), respectively. Moreover, select two prime numbers p 1 and p 2 ;
• Step 2: Update the secret keys (x 0 , α 0 ), (x 1 , α 1 ), (x 0 , α 0 ) and (x 1 , α 1 ) through (6)-(10);
• Step 3: Decompose image P into m × n blocks, i.e., H m×n . Then, the number of m × n blocks in P is v =
M ×N
m×n . H i denotes the ith block, where i = 1, 2, . . . , v. Next, we permute these blocks using (4)- (5) with key p 1 . By merging the permuted blocks into an M × N matrix, we obtain the permuted image P 1 ;
• Step 4: Divide the permuted image P 1 into four blocks
Assume that the total number of pixels in each block is k. Denote by p j , j = 1, . . . , k the j th pixel in block B i . Then, transform the blocks 2, 3, 4 , which are the proposed S-boxes in [36] (denoted by S-box-3, S-box-4, S-box-5 and S-box-6, respectively). This process is as follows: Let s j = sb i (p j + 1), where i = 1, . . . , 4 and j = 1, . . . , k. s j are the new pixels and p j are replaced by the S-box sb i . In this way, we obtain a new matrix P 2 ;
• Step 5: Transform P 2 into its binary form P b , a matrix of dimension M × 8N . Thereafter, we apply the DNA encoding rule k 1 this integer is randomly selected from {1, . . . , 8} to P b . Then, a M × 4N DNA matrix P 3 is obtained;
• Step 6: Iterate (1) for l (l ≥ 500) times to hide the transient effect using the updated initial condition x 0 and control parameter α 0 . Continue to iterate (1) for M × 4N to obtain the chaotic matrix X M ×4N . Then, the map of X from [0, 1] to {0, 1} is defined by (11)
It was mentioned above that in DNA code, A and T are always complementary, as are C and G. Thus, to calculate the complementary matrix of P 3 according to the values of X, we proceed as follows
• Step 7: Decode P 4 using the DNA decoding rule k 2 (an integer randomly selected from {1, . . . , 8}) to obtain the decoded M ×8N matrix P de . Next, carry out decimal conversions on P de to have an M × N matrix P 5 ;
• Step 8: Iterate (2) A scrambled matrix is generated as follows
• Step 9: After replacing p 1 with p 2 , we repeat once Steps (3)-(8) using (x 0 , α 0 ) and (x 1 , α 1 ) as secret keys for (1) and (2), respectively. Thus the encrypted image C is obtained.
D. DECRYPTION PROCESS
The decryption procedure is performed in the reverse order of its encryption counterpart, described previously. The SHA-256 hash values κ 1 and κ 2 , the prime numbers p 1 and p 2 , the integers k 1 and k 2 , and the S-boxes (sb i ) i=1, 2, 3, 4 should be transmitted to the decryption side. The receiver can now produce the required parameters of (1) and (2), in an effort to recover the original image properly. The decryption process, illustrated in Fig. 3 , is described in details by the following steps:
• Step 1: Perform bit-wise XOR operation between the encrypted image C and V, which is the matrix yielded in Step 8 of the encryption process using (x 1 , α 1 ) as the secret key of (2). This yields matrix C 1 ;
• Step 2: Convert C 1 to binary form C b , which is of dimension M × 8N . Next, encode C b using the DNA encoding rule k 2 and save the encoded M × 4N matrix C 2 ;
• Step 3: Calculate the complementary matrix of C 2 according to matrix Z as follows where Z is generated in Step 6 of the encryption process using (x 0 , α 0 ) as the secret key of (1);
• Step 4: Apply the DNA decoding rule k 1 to C 3 . Then, the decoded matrix C 4 , of dimension M ×8N , is yielded;
Step 4 of the encryption process but with the inverse S-boxes of 2, 3, 4 . The output of this step is a matrix denoted by C 5 ;
• Step 6: Apply Step 3 of the encryption process to C 5 , where p 2 is the key of (4). This yields the permuted matrix C 6 ;
• Step 7: After replacing p 2 with p 1 , we carry out Steps (1)-(6) once again using (x 0 , α 0 ) and (x 1 , α 1 ) as secret keys for (1) and (2), respectively. This yields the decrypted image D.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the security and performance of the proposed encryption approach against the results of several tests in [14] , [16] , and [20] . Many standard and medical 8-bit grayscale images [39] , [40] of size 512 × 512 are employed as the original images. The initial conditions (x 0 , x 1 ) are fixed at (0.3, 0.6), while the control parameters (α 0 , α 1 ) are chosen to be (3.9, 3.9). Integers m and n are both set to 4, and the prime numbers p 1 and p 2 are fixed at 29 and 41, respectively. The DNA encoding and decoding keys k 1 and k 2 are chosen to be 7 and 1, respectively. Considering that they are recently proposed and contain significant contributions overcome most of the previous algorithms, some state-of-the-art algorithms from [14] , [16] , [20] are compared to the proposed algorithm.
A. KEY SPACE ANALYSIS
The key space is defined as the entire collection of the keys that could be used in the encryption process. The key space of a good image encryption scheme should be sufficiently large to make brute-force attacks intractable. In the proposed cryptosystem, the key space includes: the initial conditions (x 0 , x 1 ), the control parameters (α 0 , α 1 ), the prime numbers p 1 and p 2 , the integers m and n, the S-boxes (sb i ) i=1,2,3,4 , the DNA encoding key k 1 , and the DNA decoding key k 2 .
Here, x 0 , x 1 ∈ (0, 1); α 0 , α 1 ∈ (0, 4]; p 1 and p 2 are prime numbers with an infinite number of values that can be used in a block permutation phase. The integers m and n are chosen to satisfy (M × N ) mod (m × n) = 0, while k 1 and k 2 are two integers randomly selected from {1, . . . , 8}, so that there are 64 possible combinations of
Step 4 of the encryption process is generated by means of a logistic map [36] with the initial condition y i 0 and the control parameter β i 0 , where
It is assumed that the computational precision of the 64-bit double-precision numbers is 2 −49 . Therefore, the total number of values of x 0 is larger than 2 49 , as are the numbers of x 1 , y 1 0 , y 2 0 , y 3 0 , y 4 0 , α 0 , α 1 , β 1 0 , β 2 0 , β 3 0 , and β 4 0 . Moreover, the security of SHA-256 with complexity of the best attack is 2 128 . Consequently, the approach possesses more than 2 716 secret keys, indicating a key length greater than log 2 (2 716 ) = 716 bits. Hence, the key space is sufficiently large to resist all presently known brute-force attacks.
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 1) UNIFORMITY OF THE BIT DISTRIBUTION WITHIN EACH BIT-PLANE
Zhang et al. [34] demonstrated that in an original image, the higher bit planes are very correlated, particularly the 7th and 8th bit planes. This fact can be exploiting by hackers to recover a significant percentage of bits in a higher bit plane, when knowing its neighboring bit plane. Therefore, bit distribution within each bit plane should be uniform, resulting in a bit-uniformity rate of 50%. As can seen from Table 2 , the bit distribution within the encrypted images' bit planes (in the first and second rounds) are more uniform than those of the original images.
2) CORRELATION OF ADJACENT PIXELS
In this section, the correlation between adjacent pixels in the original image and their respective encrypted images is studied. In original images, the value of a pixel is very close to the values of its horizontally, vertically, and diagonally adjacent pixels. As a result, the adjacent pixels in an original image are highly correlated. A cryptanalyst can exploit this weakness to break encryption. Therefore, in a ciphered image, adjacent pixels should be uncorrelated. The correlation between pairs of adjacent pixels can be calculated as follows
where x i and y i are the grayscale values of two selected adjacent pixels, N is the total number of pairs (x i , y i ) obtained from the image, and E{.} denotes the expected value of a random variable. Table 3 reports the mean of absolute values of the correlation coefficients (horizontally, vertically, and diagonally) for 3000 randomly selected pairs of adjacent pixels from the original images and their encrypted ones for the , which plot the correlations in the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions of the original and encrypted images of MR Shoulder, respectively. Therefore, the proposed encryption approach satisfies the zero correlation requirement and is highly resistant to correlation-based attacks.
3) HISTOGRAM AND CHI-SQUARE TEST
A histogram shows the gray level intensity of an image. This information can be very useful for histogram attacks against a non-uniform distribution. The images generated by a good encryption algorithm should have uniform histograms, so as to improve their resistance to statistical analysis. We have analyzed the histograms of many original images as well as their encryptions using the proposed approach. The original images of Lena, CR Chest and XA Coronary are shown in Fig. 5 along with their histograms, while Fig. 6 shows their encrypted counterparts alongside their histograms. Clearly, the histograms of the encrypted images are nearly uniform and exhibit significant differences from those of their corresponding original images. This uniformity is ensured by applying the Chi-square test [18] defined by the following equation
where L is the number of pixel levels, o i is the observed occurrence frequency of each pixel value (0 − 255) in the histogram of the encrypted image, and e i is the expected frequency count of the uniform distribution, i.e., e i = (M × N )/256. The distribution is considered uniform. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted, when the p-value is more than the significance level s (s ∈ [0, 1]). Here, the p-value is the probability of observing a sample statistic as extreme as the χ 2 test. 
4) GLOBAL ENTROPY
Global entropy is a statistical measure of randomness, which is defined as
where p(x k ) is the probability of appearance of symbol x k . The ideal entropy is obtained if all the pixels appear with the same probability, which means that the distribution of the pixels is uniform. The maximum or ideal entropy is equal to log 2 (2 8 ) = 8 bits. The mean and variance of the entropies of the different algorithms are given in Table 5 . The mean entropy attainable by the proposed approach is very close to 8, approximately equal to that in [16] , and slightly higher than those in [14] and [20] -BX. 1 This offers evidence that the proposed encryption approach is resistant entropy attacks. 
5) LOCAL ENTROPY
Unlike the intrinsically quantitative global Shannon entropy, in which assessing the true randomness of an image [41] can fail, the local Shannon entropy is used to qualitatively measure the randomness of an image. It is defined as follows [41] . Let n, n p be the local Shannon entropy for the local image blocks using the following method:
• Select arbitrarily non-overlapping image blocks B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n with n p pixels inside a test image B with K intensity scales; 1 It stands for the BX version of the encryption scheme proposed in [20] , where the pixel diffusion step is based on bitwise XOR (BX) operations.
• Calculate the Shannon entropy H B j using (17) for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}; and
• Compute the sample average of the Shannon entropy of these n image blocks as follows
The local Shannon entropies are compared in Table 6 . As can be observed from the table, the proposed approach can achieve an average local entropy of 7.902512, which is very close to the ideal value of 7.9024693 [41] . Moreover, the proposed approach is able to achieve better average local entropy compared to other tested counterparts. 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 1) KEY SENSITIVITY
Key sensitivity is the number/quantity of the cipher image changes caused by a minor change applied to the secret key. For a good cipher, a small difference in the key should lead to significant modifications in the cipher image. Denote by 
where C 1 and C 2 are given by
Here, there are n bits of difference between key 1 and key 2 , and Encrypt(.) denotes the encryption algorithm. Generally, the value of K s for a good cipher is about 0.5. Fig. 7(a) shows the results of the key sensitivity test for the proposed approach. Under this test, the indices of the n (n = 1, . . . , 8) altered bits of the secret keys cf. (1) and (2) as well as the 512 × 512 images are randomly generated for 200 iterations. We can observe that, on average, 99.3% of the obtained K s values are in [0.4991, 0.5008]. That is, they are very close to the optimal value of 0.5. Therefore, the proposed approach is highly sensitive to small changes within the encryption key. 
2) PLAINTEXT SENSITIVITY
Similar to key sensitivity, plaintext sensitivity is defined as the amount of changes in the ciphertext caused by a minor modification applied to the plaintext. For a good cipher, a small difference in the plaintext should cause considerable changes in the corresponding ciphertext. Let
. . , c 2 MN −1 and key = key 0 , key 1 , . . . , key MN −1 be the plaintext, the ciphertext and the key, respectively. Then the plaintext sensitivity P s can be computed as follows
Here, there are n bits of difference between P 1 and P 2 , and Encrypt(.) denotes the encryption algorithm. Generally speaking, for a good cipher, the value of P s is about 0.5. Fig. 7(b) shows the plaintext sensitivity test for the proposed approach. Under this test, the indices of the n (n = 1, . . . , 8) altered bits as well as the 512 × 512 images are randomly generated for 200 iterations. It is observed that, on average, 99.3% of the obtained P s values fall within the range of [0.4992, 0.5009]. That is, the P s values are always quite close to the optimal value of 0.5. Therefore, the proposed approach is extremely sensitive to small changes in the plaintext.
3) UACI AND NPCR
In a good encryption approach, the encrypted image is highly sensitive to slight changes in the original image (e.g., a single pixel change). In this context, two common quantitative measures are employed, namely NPCR (number of pixel change rate) and UACI (unified average changing intensity). We employ the NPCR to measure the number of different pixels. However, the average intensity difference is given by the UACI. The NPCR and UACI are defined by (21) and (22), respectively (21) where (i, j) is given by
where F 1 and F 2 are two encrypted images whose corresponding original images have only a single-pixel difference, the (i, j)th pixel of F 1 and F 2 are denoted by F 1 (i, j) and F 2 (i, j), respectively; n is the number of bits used to represent a grayscale pixel value.
To quantify the impact on the encrypted image of a one-bit pixel change in the original image, we calculated the NPCR and UACI for many grayscale images with the proposed and its comparative algorithms. The means and the variances of the NPCR and UACI for each algorithm are reported in Table 7 .
As can be seen from Table 7 , for the proposed algorithm, the mean NPCR and mean UACI values exceed 99.6% and 33.4%, respectively. Therefore, the proposed algorithm is highly sensitive to small pixel changes in the original image. In other words, the proposed encryption approach can make two encrypted images completely different, even given a single-bit difference between two source images. In addition, the proposed approach achieves better average NPCR and UACI performances compared to the others tested. As a result, the encryption approach is secure against differential attacks. VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 7. NPCR and UACI (mean and variance) of the encrypted images due to one-bit change in the original image. 
D. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 1) OCCLUSION ATTACK
Encrypted images transmitted across a communications channel may be affected by data losses, which makes the decryption process incomplete or invalid. In this context, a loss operation known as the occlusion attack is applied on the encrypted images to test the ability of the proposed scheme in recovering the original image. The encrypted images of CR Chest with 1/16, 1/8, 1/4, and 1/2 data loss rates are shown in Figs. 8(a)-(d) , respectively. The corresponding decrypted images from Figs. 8(a)-(d) are displayed in Figs. 8(e)-(h) , respectively. It is observed that even if only half of an encrypted image has left unchanged, the corresponding decrypted image retains most of the original visual information. This demonstrates the efficacy of the proposed encryption algorithm to withstand occlusion attacks. Besides, we calculated the PSNR between the original image and the decrypted images for the proposed and its aforementioned comparative algorithms. The obtained results are listed in Table 8 , where the proposed algorithm outperforms the comparative ones in resisting occlusion attacks. 
2) NOISE ATTACK
In real-world applications, digital images are transmitted through a communications channel which is usually subject to channel noise. To analyze the noise immunity of the proposed encryption algorithm, we assume that the encrypted image of CR Chest is contaminated by the salt & pepper noise of densities 0.0020, 0.0050, 0.0500, 0.1000, 0.2500, and 0.5000. The corresponding decrypted images are shown in Figs. 9(a)-(f) , respectively. As can be seen from these figures, the decrypted images are noisy but perceivable. Moreover, the PSNR values between the decrypted and original images are listed in Table 9 , which also includes a comparison with some related works. The given results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm outperforms the comparative ones in resisting noise attacks.
3) HISTOGRAM EQUALIZATION
Histogram equalization is a technique of strengthening image contrast using an image's histogram. Through this adjustment, the image intensity distribution becomes quite uniform. Therefore, the areas of lower local contrast benefit from higher contrast and the most redundant intensity values are efficiently spread out. The encrypted CR Chest image attacked by histogram equalization is displayed in Fig. 10(a) . The corresponding decrypted image shown in Fig. 10(b) is blurry but recognizable. Under this attack, the PSNR value between the original and decrypted images using the proposed algorithm is 30.0205 dB, which exceeds those of the comparative algorithms (see Table 10 ). Consequently, the proposed algorithm can well resist histogram equalization attacks.
E. KNOWN-PLAINTEXT AND CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS
Following the sufficiently recognized principle of Kerckhoffs' in the cryptology community [42] , we assume that all details of the encryption/decryption cryptosystems are known to attackers, which implies that the security of an algorithm depends only on the decryption key. Therefore, the main task of cryptanalysis is to restructure the key or its equivalent form, which can effectively decrypt all or partial contents of any encrypted plaintext by the cipher. Furthermore, a cryptanalyst can find a method to retrieve the plaintext from the ciphertext without identifying the secret key. In fact, he/she looks for correlations between the ciphertext and the key or the ciphertext and the plaintext. This search can be carried out based upon different assumptions leading to four different attacks listed below in descending order (from the hardest to the easiest attacks), namely ciphertext-only attack, known plaintext attack, chosen plaintext attack, and chosen ciphertext attack. Among them, the known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks are the stronger ones, and if an algorithm can resist them, it can hold off the other attacks. In the proposed algorithm, the SHA-256 hash function is employed to compute the initial values and the control parameters of the chaotic maps. Consequently, they are susceptible to a single bit difference in the secret key or the original image.
Thus, they are correlated with both the secret key and the original image. This brings about the generation of dissimilar chaotic sequences for different original images even with the same collection of keys. Consequently, a cryptanalyst who tries to analyze the proposed algorithm cannot obtain useful information about both the secret key and the output image, since these information depends on the input image. Accordingly, the proposed algorithm can resist the knownplaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks.
In an attack scenario, attackers always employ all white and all black images to make the permutation/substitution processes of the ciphers invalid, and then try to infer some useful information. The statistical and differential analyses of the all white and all black images are shown in Fig. 11 and Table 11 . The obtained encrypted images are random-like images, so no useful information can be extracted from them. The histogram distributions shown in Figs. 11(b) and 11(d) are quite uniform, the correlation values in all directions are close to 0, the global entropy is nearly equal to 8, and the local entropy is very close to the ideal value of 7.9024693. Moreover, the obtained NPCR and UACI values are quite close to the expected ones, i.e., 99.6% and 33.4%, respectively, which proves the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm against differential attacks. With regards to the experimental results, the proposed algorithm can effectively encipher the all white and all black images and resist known-plaintext and chosenplaintext attacks. 
F. FURTHER COMPARISON WITH SOME RECENT DNA-BASED ALGORITHMS
To compare the performances of the proposed algorithm and demonstrate its superiority with regards to existing DNAbased ones [24] - [30] , we conduct a comparative study based upon some performance indicators as in from [43] . The proposed scheme possesses the largest key space, and it is the second best algorithm concerning entropy, while the algorithm proposed in [26] is ranked first. The studied algorithms have similar correlation coefficients that reach nearly null correlation. Only the proposed algorithm and those in [28] and [30] are proven robust against occlusion attacks, noise attacks, and histogram equalization attacks. Table 12 shows that the NPCR and UACI values of the studied algorithms are all close to the expected values, i.e., 99.6% and 33.4% respectively, except for the algorithm proposed in [25] , where both the NPCR and UACI values are approximately equal to zero and the algorithm is vulnerable to differential attacks. It is clear that the proposed scheme exceeds most of the existing ones concerning aforementioned criterions. Indeed, it has stronger resistance to brute force attacks than the other comparative algorithms, while the proposed algorithm and those in [28] and [30] are immune to statistical and differential attacks.
G. EXTENSION OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM TO COLOR IMAGES
The proposed algorithm can be extended to encrypt RGB images. A color image is first decomposed into three components of R, G, and B, each of which is then encrypted using the proposed algorithm. After that, the encrypted components are merged, yielding the encrypted RGB image. The RGB original images of Airplane and Mammogram are shown in Figs. 12(a) and 12(b) , respectively. Their corresponding encrypted images are illustrated in Figs. 12(c) and 12(d) , respectively. These results demonstrate that our proposed algorithm is suitable for color images.
H. TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS Table 13 shows the time complexity orders and their orders of magnitude for a 512 × 512 grayscale image using the proposed algorithm compared to its counterparts in [16] and [20] -BX, [14] , and [24] . This table is derived from a complexity analysis detailed in Appendix. Through this analysis, the proposed algorithm is shown to be the second faster one after the one in [20] -BX. This confirms that our proposed algorithm has a good time complexity.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a new chaos-based encryption scheme for medical images. The cryptosystem consists of two iterative phases, preceded by a key generation layer that employs the SHA-256 hash function. Each phase of the encyption scheme is composed of block-based permutation, pixel-based substitution, DNA encoding, bit-level substitution, DNA decoding, and bit-level diffusion. The key-streams in the bitlevel substitution are generated by the logistic-Chebyshev map, while the sine-Chebyshev map is employed to produce the key-streams in the bit-level diffusion. Several security and performance analyses were carried out to validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. It was shown that the key space of the proposed scheme is larger than 2 716 , and the average correlation between pairs of encrypted images is 0.0008. The average global and local entropy are 7.9993 and 7.9025, respectively. Moreover, whether for the original image or the encryption key, the test of sensitivity to bit alteration gives very close values to the optimum. Additionally, the average values of the NPCR and UACI are 99.6179% and 33.4784%, respectively. The time complexity of the proposed algorithm is lower compared to some recently reported image encryption algorithms. Considering the above results, the proposed scheme fulfills all the necessary criteria of a good encryption scheme, including a large key space, resistance to statistical attacks, differential, chosen/known plaintext attacks. Moreover, the proposed algorithm has linear running time, implying that it is computationally efficient.
APPENDIX TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED IMAGE ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM AS WELL AS THOSE IN [16], [20]-BX, [14], AND [24]
Table 14 describes how many times each operation is repeated according to the number of pixels MN . With regards to searching and sorting operations, considering a vector of n elements, searching an element in the vector is of time complexity O(n). Assuming the use of the quicksort algorithm [44] , sorting the vector is of average time complexity n log(n). The SHA-256 hash algorithm entry is of size 512 bits, and the algorithm has a constant number of operations. The algorithms in [14] and [20] use randomly generated numbers. To derive their time complexities, we consider a linear congruential generator since it is widely used as a uniform random number generator [45] .
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